In the past few years, several countries have announced explicit target ranges for I inflation. New Zealand did this in 1990, Canada in 1991, the United Kingdom in 1992, and Sweden and Finland in 1994. Even when an inflation target is achieved, the future price level is not easy to predict because none of these countries has committed itself to reversing the consequences of shocks to the price level. Indeed, in New Zealand there is an explicit commitment root to reverse certain such shocks.
One alternative to inflation targeting is price level targeting.' The adoption of a constant price ]evel target would have several advantages over an inflation target. Chief among these is that consumers and firms could write simpler contracts and make long-run plans without worrying about inflation. Price level targeting also may avoid the "time-inconsistency" problem of an inflation targeting regime in that the monetary authority would have less incentive to inflate the economy in a one-time bid to increase output temporarily Under a price level target, any "surprise" inflation must he reversed.
Critics of price level targeting argue that making a commitment to reverse surprise increases in the price level is undesirable because a fall in the general price level, or deflation, can have harmful effects. One such critic, Stanley Fischer, put it this way: "I argue for the inflation target because I fear the consequences of having to aim to deflate the econotny half the time, which is what the price level approach requires."
Since the end of World War II, year-overyear declines in the price level have been rare in the industrialized world; during the period of the gold standard, however, both long downward trends in the price level and much shorter periods of falling price levels were common.
3 Ironically; although Irving Fisher advocated a price level target precisely to avoid the protracted downward (and upward) swings in the price level observed under a gold standard, the experience of this period provokes, in part, the criticism of price level targeting today Perhaps more important for these beliefs about deflation is the deflationary period (not examined here) from 1929 through 1933, in which the price level fell by 20 to 30 percent. Bernanke (1995) argues persuasively that this price decline, caused by the U.S. determination to stay on the gold standard, was a major contributor to the severity of the Great Depression. This article reexamines the facts surrounding temporary periods of deflation that occurred under the gold standard from 1870 to 1913. We first describe the behavior of price, money and output data, then perform some simple tests to determine whether output growth grew more slowly during periods of falling prices and whether knowledge of a falling price level would, in fact, have helped predict lower output growth. Although we must be cautious about drawing conclusions from 100-year-old data generated under a much different monetary regime, another look at this experience is warranted because several countries have adopted policies that are likely to he associated with temporary periods of deflation. The next section briefly reviews why deflation may affect real output. A description of our data set and an explanation of our statistical tests follow, We then report the results of our tests, before concluding with some ideas for future work.
A price level is o weighted overage of prices i n o country. Price level targets may be either constant over twe (static) or hove a trend. In this paper, we ose pica level torget~ngto refer to o static price level target. The sboded insert at pp. 34 ond 35 distinguishes price level ond inflation targets.
2 Pi ne Finopciol Times, Jane 24, 1994. Note that Fischer refers to o static price level target. A price level target with a positve trend world onreqeire the monetary outhority to "disinf late' half the twa, thor i s, to mr a rote of inflo' toe below the long'ron trend.
Disinflaton is not the only poten' tol deowbock of price level targets. Some oppose them becoose they rnighr lend to groorer short-rev nolotlity i n the inflator rate.°P eriods i n 'which prices fall one yeorwrer-yeor basis ore considered pedods of deflaton. We dropped Jopon from the sample hecoose it did not hone a metelic standard dying the 19th centur~nnd leceese its nonionol honking ond finenciol system man lost forming (see 8ockos and Kehne, 1992) . Uniqnely, lopan's gnnwth onder lolling pices (5.4 percent) mos sobstontinily higher non ts grreti ondnr rising prices 11.5 pencenol.
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It is now widely accepted that there is no long-term trade-off between inflation and output or employment; the existence of a short-run trade-off, on the other hand, is not general])' denied. There are several explanations for this trade-off: lags between actual and expected inflation (see Flume, 1752; Fisher, 1926; and Friedman, 1968 ); misperceptions about relative and general price shifts (Lucas, 1972); and staggered wage or price setting (Fischer, 1977; Taylor, 1980) .~None of these theories, however, predicts that lowering the price level is more costly than lowering inflation, Nevertheless, prices have not fallen (by anything more than a trivial amount) in any major economy since 1945.
The means by which deflation might reduce output, however, are often not explicitly stated.
3 One view is that deflation interferes with the adjustment of relative prices because nominal wages or some prices do not adjust downward easily If wages and/or prices are sticky downwards, a negative demand shock will tend to cause persistent unemployment as prices and wages are slow to fall as required to clear markets. With a sufficiently high inflation trend, relative prices can adjust to a negative demand shock without any actual prices having to fall. Because nnarkets work better with a little inflation, according to this view output will be less variable over business cycle horizons and, perhaps, even higher in the long run.
Critics of the theory of downward price rigidity point out that many wages and prices do, in fact, decrease, and that the extent to which prices are sticky depends on whether people expect inflation. An atmosphere of overall price stability will make people more willing to accept reductions in their wages or prices.
There is mixed evidence from rnicroecononnic data on the idea that prices are sticky;
certainly, some prices change tnore frequently than others. There is, however, little evidence of asynnmetry in price stickiness. 3 Blinder (1991) presents the results of a survey in which firnus report asyonrnetric price rigidity He finds greater upward rigidity Nevertheless, despite evidence to the contrary, many economists continue to believe that some prices are inflexible downward and that even temporary periods of deflation might reduce output through this channel. 2
Bernanke andJames (1991) argue that deflation might alternatively affect the economy by increasing the real value of nominally denominated debt. For example, a 2 percent annual deflation would translate a nominal interest rate of 4 percent into a real interest rate of 6 percent. Increasing the real rate of interest might promote debtor insolvency and financial distress.
The opposition to price level targeting from those who fear the results of deflation, either because of downward price rigidity or the consequences of debt-deflation, makes the stud) of the historical association between output and deflation worthwhile. A review of the eiodence nould he a first step in considerong whether a central bank should now adopt a p ice 1 ci el target.
u e tu o set of data Thc fir t consists of 44 annual oh eri.anons on moneyp rices, interest rates and output tn the United Kingdom fronn 1870 to 1913 The period 1880-1913 is generally considered the heyday of the cla socal mt rnational gold standard. We end ahe sample before the beginning of World \\ar I in 1914. The source for the monetars sero s o Capie and Wehher (1985) . ihe anterest atc is a shortterm one from the last quarter of each year. The output sene is Feunstemns (1972) compromise estnnn~teof GDP and, therefore, ho tcnplacnt prncc deflator Os used as rhe proce scrod All data are annual to conform to thc n des nty of u ing annual GDP data.
Tb econd data set consost of 44 annual output and onflatcon ohs rs utnon 1870 to 1013) Ironu ninc of 10 on lu trnaln ccl cc untries onnpalcd fo comparoson of nnt rnational hu one cicles hi Backu md 1< hcc (1992), 
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States and France returning to the gold standard, raising the demand for and price of gold. The nominal interest rate seems to display typical cyclical fluctuations around a stationary mean.
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-'~< Figure 3 shows the higher average rates of inflation, displaying a scatterplot of the mean rates of output growth vs. mean inflation rates for each ofnine countries from the Backus and Kehoe data set for each of the two subperiods (1870-96 and 1897-1913) . The figure shows that average inflation rates were uniformly lower in the first period (1870-96) than they were in the second period (1897) (1898) (1899) (1900) (1901) (1902) (1903) (1904) (1905) (1906) (1907) (1908) (1909) (1910) (1911) (1912) (1913) Consistent with the idea that deflation reduces output growth, the mean levels of output growth also appear to he lower during the first period. Curiously across countries there seems to be a negative relationship between output and price changes in the first period and a positive relationship in the second.
Output Growth and Deflation Over Shart Horizons
Examining inflation and output growth over the two long subperiods is a convenient way to examine the relationship between average inflation and average output growth over longer periods. It does not, however, get directly at the question of whether price declines were associatetl with lower output FEDERAL RESERVE growth over short periods. To see this, we sort the data on output growth by the rise or fall of prices. For the purpose of categorization, we define a deflationary period as any year in which prices fell; we make no distinction between the episodes on the basis of length, severity or cause. For the United Kingdom data, five of nine deflationary episodes lasted more than one year, and three lasted more than two years. The positive relationship between price changes and output growth must be interpreted with a great deal of caution. First, the positive correlation between price changes and output growth could be due to chance.
In other words, how likely is it that the observed data would have been generated if the means of output growth were equal under deflation and inflation? Second, the previous section only examined the relationship between price changes and output growth period by period; we would like to know about their relationship over time as well, Third, even if deflation is statistically associated with lower output growth, that does not mean it causes lower output growtha third factor could be causing both.
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To test whether the apparent relationships between output growth and price level changes pictured in Figures 3 and 4 Infrion Note: Sample I = inflation, sample 2 = deflation.
heal significance of the correlation.
The second and third columns of Table 2 present results of the F-tests of the hypothesis that the mean output growth for each of the nine countries in Figure 3 was the same during the second period (1897) (1898) (1899) (1900) (1901) (1902) (1903) (1904) (1905) (1906) (1907) (1908) (1909) (1910) (1911) (1912) (1913) as in the first period , The third column gives the probability that we would obtain at least as extreme a result if the means were truly the same. This number, called the "p-value," is often loosely interpreted as the strength of the evidence against the hypothesis that the means are the same, Values less FEDERAL RESERVE RANK OF St LOUIS price declines were of comparable magnitude to mean price rises, and periods of mild price rises were only slightly more common than periods of declining prices; the data show that prices rose about 46-67 percent of the time during the sample. Figure 4 is analogous to Figure 3 in that it depicts mean output growth for the nine countries from the Backus and Kehoe sample, conditioned on whether prices rose or fell, Again, the means of output growth during periods of rising prices appear generally higher than the means during periods of falling prices. This positive relationship between price changes and output growth is again consistent with the idea that deflationary periods were associated with relatively hard times. Period (1870-96) Table 2 ). which strongly suggests that it is very possible that the data were generated by processes with equal means. That is, for only two countries could we conclude that aggregate mean output growth in the second period was statistically significantly higher Table 2 present results of similar tests for equality of means for the data in Figure 4 . For Italy and Sweden, we reject the idea that the mean of output under inflation was the same as that during deflation. For this test, however, aggregating the observations across countries leads to the conclusion that output growth was significantly lower in a statistical sense during periods of deflation. The p-value for the test of that hypothesis is 0.08 (see the fifth column, last row of Table 3 ).
Mean Output Growth In the First

Have an 'C"
The previous analysis described the period-by-period relationship between average output growth and average price changes conditioned on the sign of the price changes. Macroeconomic variables, however, influence each other not just contemporaneously hut also over time. The symmetry of the dynamic relationship between output growth and price changes is important, because an essential implication of the idea that deflation is harmful to output is that output reacts asymmetrically to price changes over time.
To explore this issue, we again break the price changes into positive and negative changes so that we can fit two systems of regression equations (called vector autoregressions, or VAR 5 ) in which we regress output growth and price changes on their own lagged values. VARs are a commonly used, general method of modehng the dynamic relationship between macroeconomic variables. In the first system of equations, we treat positive and negative price changes as two different variables and allow them to influence output growth (and each other) differently" In the second system, we treat price changes as one variable, forcing positive and negative changes to have mirror-image effects on output growth. Then we examine which model fits the data better.
We judge the fit of the systems according to two commonly used criteria: the Akaike information and the Schwarz information criteria. These measures of the fit of the two models on the Backus and Kehoe data are shown in 
PRICE LEVEL VS. INFLATION TARGETING
Price stability has attracted a lot of attention lately Unfortunately the important choice between inflation and price level targeting has been neglected. Either would lead to a lower and more stable inflation rate than we have observed over the past 25 years, hut there is a fundamental distinction between the two. Price level targeting "corrects" past errors in monetary policy while inflation targeting ignores them.
To make this distinction more concrete, consider the problem of a monetary authority with an inflation target of zero to 2 percent in which the 1995 inflation rate is 3 percent, 1 percentage point above the target range. In choosing monetary policy for 1996, the authority will aim, as usual, for an inflation rate of zero to 2 percent. It will not try to make up for past errors. In contrast, if the same monetary authority has targeted a static price level (zero percent inflation on average) and observes 1 percent inflation, it will have to try to reduce the price level by I percent in the years ahead.
This difference makes price level targeting a long-run commitment in ways in which inflation targeting is not. There are three major consequences of this divergence between the two, First, the average rate of inflation over a long horizon can be predicted very well under a price level targeting regime; it is less certain under an inflation targeting regime.r Advocates of price level targeting often point to the greater certainty of the price level (average inflation rate) in the long run as an advantage. As the accompanying chart shows, uncertainty about the future price level associated with an inflation targeting range of zero to 2 percent increases as the time horizon grows. In contrast, the level of uncertainty associated with a price level target is constant (and small), even over long time horizons, For example, an investor evaluating the real return on, or the present value of, a project can do so much more easily because the price level can be predicted over long periods.
Second, an important theoretical advantage of the long-run nature of price level targeting is that by being a multi-period commitment, it does not suffer from the time-inconsistency problem described by Barro and Gordon (1983) . In their model, a monetary authority has an incentive to produce a one-time monetary stimulus that results in a burst of output Tire expected predictor error forfuture overoge iofloton would go to zero under a price level targeting regime as the time horizon increases, while it would remain constant under an oflotion targeting regime. 0< leroose the Akoihe and Schworz criterio ore rov'resred model selec. tior cniterir, thep ore notformal stotstcol tests and do not hove 'sigrificonce levels.' Instead, frep irformolly testfor stotstcel sigrifi once by perolizirg more complex models.
is favored.' 2 These tests provide mixed evidence on the hypothesis that price changes have an asymmetric effect on output for the countries considered here.
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Previously we showed that, under the gold standard, output growth tended to be lower than average during periods of deflation. Then we showed at least some evidence in favor of the hypothesis of an asynnmetric dynamic relationship between price changes and output growth. Although we cannot test directly whether the deflation itself was the cause of lower growth, we can test whether the falling price level helped to forecast it. Such a test of hnear forecasting ability is called a test of Granger causality If price changes improve the forecasts of output growth, they are said to "Granger-cause" output growth. The idea is that if a falling price level causes lower growth, then it should precede output growth and he useful in forecasting it. Note, however, that if a third factor is causing both deflation and lower growth, this statistical procedure can find that deflation helps forecast lower growth, even when it is not the cause of lower growth. A third major difference motivates the subject of this article. A static price level target requires the monetary authority to reduce the price level in response to surprise increases. While an inflation rate target may produce occasional reductions in the price level accidentally, they will he rare if the average inflation rate is high relative to the volatility in inflation. In contrast, under a static price level target. price changes will he negative roughly half the tione.
A hybrid of targeting inflation and targeting a static price level is targeting a small upward trend in the price level. Such a system has the long-tenn predictability of a static price level target hnmt does not require the monetary authority to correct past upward deviations in the price level with deflation.
This orgrwerre ossemes that even onticipeted debtors will be os cosfy Os the benefit geined from the initial irforion, To test whether price changes innprove the forecasts of output growth, we first forecast output grosvth using only its own lags. Then we add lagged price changcs as another explanatory variable to see if their inclttsion rinproves the forecasts. The second column of Table 4 displays the test statistic and p-value (significance level) froon the tests that price changes do not Granger-cause (help forecast) output growth. For Australia, Canada and Germany we reject the null hypothesis than lagged values of price changes do not improve the forecasts of output growth. ln other words, the data suggest that price changes do help forecast output growth for three countries in this period. We should emphasize that rejections of Granger causality tests are a necessary' hut not sufficient condition to determine that output growth is not "caused" by price changes. Once again, the data provide us with mixed results on the idea that price changes have an asymmetric effect on output.
\Ve can also investigate svhether output growth helps forecast price changes Because we have only a small sample, the predictive power of one variable on another must be very strong for tests for Granger causality to find a relation. Weaker but important relations may not be found at all. Statisticians would say that tests of Granger causality may have "low power." Another complication is that both price and output changes may result from some third factor, which has been left out of the analysis.
No matter how confident we are that we understand how these economies functioned TOO years ago, we must be cautious about using historical data to answer pohcy questions today For example, economic structures such as the wage-setting mechanism, the degree of flexibility of the labor market and credit allocation mechanisms-~-allof which may influence how changes in the money supply translate to changes in the price level-have changed a great deal in the last century Even methods of data collection are much different now.
Finally we remind the reader that the economists who observed this episode first-hand believed that deflation was a disruptive factor causing lower output growth. Many recommended a price level target as a remedy for that prohlem.'P resumably the finite sample variance of the price level would be much different under a price level targeting regime than it was under the gold standard. Some evidence in favor of this view can be found hy comparing Sweden~experience with prices during the Great Depression with that of countries that stayed on the gold standard. Sweden left the gold standard in 1931 and began to target the consumer price index.
A number of countries, including New Zealand, Canada and the United Kingdom, have recently announced explicit target ranges for inflation, Such a policy has also been suggested for the United States, Others have suggested that we target the price level instead of the rate of inflation. One potential reason to oppose this suggestion is that such a policy would necessitate that the monetary authority reduce the level of prices, that is, deflate the economy to offset any transient, positive shocks to the price level. The historical association between deflation and bad economic performance has led some economists to reject price level targeting as had policy
We find that lower output growth was associated with periods of deflation in nearly all the countries examined. For a majority of the countries, the dynamic relationship between price changes and output growth appeared to be synnmetric, and price changes did not help forecast output growth. There is more evidence, however, that output growth forecasts price changes.
Ultimately a final conclusion about the desirability of a price level target requires more complete economic modeling than we have attempted. What we have presented are some simple facts about deflation and output that are touted as reasons to reject a particular type of price stability Economists who support price level targeting must ntake the case that the teanporary periods of deflation necessary to maintain long-term price stability would be fundamentally different than those observed under the gold standard. VF~I[S EPTEMSES/OCTOSER1 9,5 "="u"me 0O", ii.tt.mrsItmm~iyi.CES Fischer, Stanley. 'Lang-lirm Contracts, Rational Expectations, and
